Pay-for-performance advertising schemes such as pay-per-click (PPC) and pay-per-sale (PPS) have grown in popularity with the recent advances in digital technologies for targeting advertising and measuring outcomes. Meanwhile, the traditional pay-per-impression (PPI) scheme persists, and several advertising providers have started to oer a hybrid mix of PPI and PPC schemes.
This research is based on two fundamental observations about Internet advertising. First, signicant information asymmetry exists regarding advertisement performances. The performance of an advertisement, in terms of number of clicks or sales generated, depends not only on the quality of the advertisement but also on how eectively an advertising provider can target the right Internet users at the right time. Advertisers are not perfectly informed about advertising providers' targeting quality, and advertising providers may not be informed about the quality of the advertisements provided by the advertiser. Pricing schemes matter in the context of information asymmetry because advertising providers may then use pricing schemes to dierentiate themselves and to reveal their targeting quality. Second, because advertisers dier in their valuation of an impression, and the supply of impressions is limited, allocative eciency matters in Internet advertising.
4 Dierent pricing schemes focus on dierent elements of an advertiser's valuation, and may therefore, result in dierent allocations of impressions. The impact of pricing scheme on allocative eciency is most 4 Allocative eciency is dened as the ability of a market to allocate goods to those agents who value them the most.
evident when advertising impressions are allocated using auctions, which are increasingly adopted by advertising providers including Google, Facebook, and Linkedin (see for an account of the auction format used by Google). Dierent pricing schemes may result in dierent rankings of advertisers in these auctions, and thus, dierent allocative eciencies. In light of these observations, we study the optimality of the pricing schemes in an auction framework by modeling their impact on allocative eciency, as well as on the ability of advertising providers to dierentiate themselves.
Our analysis oers two important insights. First, the choice of a pure pay-for-performance pricing scheme (say PPC or PPS) can serve as a dierentiation strategy for high-quality providers.
In general, high-quality providers are more likely to oer pay-for-performance schemes as they reveal the provider's targeting quality, and low-quality providers prefer a PPI scheme. Naturally, a pay-for-performance scheme is more likely in the presence of many low-quality providers as pooling would be more costly for high-quality advertising providers. However, given the uncertainty about advertiser quality, pay-for-performance schemes typically result in allocative ineciencies, and in some cases the cost of this ineciency outweighs any benets from better dierentiation. Consequently, high-quality providers may nd it optimal to pool with low-quality ones by choosing a PPI scheme. As providers get better at estimating advertiser quality, pay-for-performance schemes become a more attractive strategy for high-quality providers. The trade-o between revealing superior targeting quality and minimizing allocative ineciency drives a high-quality provider's choice of pricing scheme.
Second, when advertising providers have a choice of oering a hybrid pricing scheme (e.g., oering both PPI and PPC for advertisers to choose), high-quality providers prefer the hybrid scheme to the pure PPI scheme and choose pure pay-for-performance schemes less often. A hybrid scheme can lead to allocative eciencies similar to a pure PPI scheme because high-quality advertisers self-select into the PPI portion of the hybrid scheme. Yet, the costs to a high-quality provider from pooling with low-quality ones are reduced compared with a pure PPI scheme as only a portion of advertisers who choose the PPI portion of the hybrid scheme may misjudge a provider's targeting quality. For this reason, a hybrid scheme dominates the PPI scheme for high-quality providers. By adopting a hybrid pricing scheme, high-quality providers can force low-quality providers to follow suit, causing the hybrid scheme to supplant the PPI scheme in equilibrium. Moreover, in some cases high-quality providers may nd it benecial to substitute the hybrid scheme for the more costly pure pay-for-performance schemes. The spread of the hybrid scheme benets high-quality providers and the Internet advertising industry as a whole because it achieves higher allocative eciency than pure pay-for-performance schemes.
Our research contributes to a growing literature on Internet advertising auctions. and Varian (2007) analyze the equilibria in search advertising auctions as generalized secondprice (GSP) auctions. Several papers examine advertising auction design (Chen et al., 2009; Feng, 2008; Liu et al., 2010; Weber and Zheng, 2007) and its interaction with consumer search (Athey and Ellison, 2011; Xu et al., 2010 Xu et al., , 2011 . In addition, empirical research on advertising auctions has grown steadily Zhang and Feng, 2011) .
Several authors (Rutz and Bucklin, 2007; Animesh et al., 2009; Yao and Mela, 2011; Abhishek et al., 2010 ) have examined the relationship between an advertisers' bid and outcomes such as rank, clickthrough rate, and conversions, while others (Animesh et al., 2011; Ghose and Yang, 2009; Jeziorski and Segal, 2009 ) focus on consumer behavior. Extant research on advertising auctions largely takes the pricing scheme for granted, and surprisingly the theoretical or empirical studies have failed to examine the choice of pricing schemes, or their impact on advertiser and provider strategies.
A few studies have examined pricing schemes used in early days of Internet advertising when auctions were not as common. Hu (2004) and Hu et al. (2010) study pricing schemes as an optimal contract design problem between one provider and one advertiser. They nd that Internet advertising pricing should include appropriate performance-based elements to provide incentives for the provider and the advertiser to improve advertisement performance. Sundararajan (2003) examines pricing schemes as an optimal two-part tari problem. He shows that, because advertisers are risk averse, pay-for-performance pricing is always optimal, even when providers are constrained to oer PPI in parallel. In contrast, our ndings show that pay-for-performance may be less than optimal due to its allocative ineciencies -a dening feature of the sponsored search auctions context.
Furthermore, oering a hybrid scheme is an opportunity, rather than a liability, for high quality providers. A key distinction between this research and above papers is that we examine pricing schemes in an auction setting where allocative eciency matters.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the rst to establish the rationale for hybrid pricing in Internet advertising auctions. A few recent papers have examined Internet advertising auctions with hybrid pricing. Zhu and Wilbur (2010) study the equilibrium bidding in hybrid advertising auctions but in a dierent setting from ours. In their model, advertisers can choose to induce more or fewer clicks after the slots are allocated. Their study takes the hybrid pricing for granted and does not explain why hybrid pricing is used in the rst place. In their study, the number of clicks generated is aected by advertisers' ex-post actions. In contrast, we study an information asymmetry model in which the number of clicks generated is aected by ex-ante characteristics of advertisers and advertising providers. Edelman and Lee (2008) compare unweighted pure PPC and PPS auctions with a PPC/PPS hybrid auction. They show that advertisers will bid truthfully in the hybrid scheme and that hybrid auctions may produce no less revenue than unweighted pure PPC and PPS auctions since the latter two are special cases of PPC/PPS hybrid auctions. It is unclear though what their conclusion will be if PPC and PPS auctions are weighted by advertisers expected quality, which is the case studied in this paper. Goel and Munagala (2009) analyze a dierent hybrid auction where advertisers submit a PPI bid and a PPC bid for the provider to choose. They show that such a hybrid auction maintains at least (1 − 1/e) of the weighted-PPC auction revenue. But their hybrid auction model diers from the real-world hybrid auctions in which advertiser submits a single bid. In sum, the existing research on hybrid auctions does not explain why hybrid auctions are used in the rst place.
Our research is also related to the vast literature on optimal pricing of congestible services such as network infrastructure and computing services (Bashyam, 2000; Dewan and Mendelson, 1990; Gupta and Stahl, 1997; Gupta et al., 2011; Hosanagar et al., 2005; Masuda and Whang, 2006; Mendelson, 1985) and information goods (Choudhary, 2010; Jain and Kannan, 2002; Sundararajan, 2004) . Both streams of research have compared xed and usage-based pricing. Choudhary (2010) , in particular,
shows that two identical information goods sellers can dierentiate on pricing schemes to avoid perfect competition, and sellers will oer both xed and usage-based pricing only when their oerings are suciently dierentiated. While parallels exist between usage-based pricing of information goods and pay-for-performance in Internet advertising, there are notable distinctions: information goods are non-rivaled (capacitated services are subject to limited congestion), whereas advertising resources are rivaled and subject to capacity constraints. More important, as a unique feature of our problem, advertising performance is jointly determined by both provider and advertiser, whereas the usage of informational goods and capacitated services is typically determined by user alone.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the modeling primitives and Section 3 details the equilibrium analyses. Section 4 discusses implications of our ndings and concludes.
The Model
We consider two sets of risk-neutral players, advertising providers and advertisers. Each provider has a single impression to oer to one of the n advertisers. 5 A provider may be the owner of the impression or an intermediary who sells the impression on behalf of its owner. Similarly, an advertiser may be a marketer or its agent. The transaction between providers and advertisers proceeds in the following way. A single provider is randomly chosen to meet the n advertisers. The provider then uses an auction to allocate the impression among the advertisers.
We focus on clicks as a performance measure. Advertisers dier in valuation per click (valuation for short), denoted as v ∈ [0, 1]. 6 Valuations are private information, independently and identically distributed according to the distribution F (v), which has a strictly positive and dierentiable density function f (v). We assume that the increasing hazard rate (IHR) condition holds, i.e.,
This condition is satised by common distributions such as uniform, normal, and logistic.
The click-through rate, dened as the probability of being clicked on, is a measure of an advertisement's performance and is jointly determined by the advertiser quality a and the provider quality b:
An advertiser's quality a captures the attractiveness of the advertisement. An advertiser's quality is high if the advertiser has a competitive product or an appealing oer. All else equal, a high-quality advertiser has a higher click-through rate than a low-quality advertiser. A provider's quality b captures the eectiveness of the provider's targeting technology. A provider's quality is higher if the provider uses technologies to target the most relevant Internet users, so that they tend to click on advertisements from this provider more often. Such targeting technologies typically involve using information, such as time, location, demographics, contextual data (content being requested), and behaviorial data (click/shopping history), to guide advertisement placements. The provider's targeting quality should be distinguished from the quality of raw trac. With the help of rigorous targeting, high-quality providers can nd nuggets buried in low-quality trac and present 5 In practice, advertising providers tend to oer multiple slots simultaneously. Several authors (e.g., Liu et al. (2010) ) oer detailed analysis of such multiple-slot auctions. Having multiple slots complicates the equilibrium bidding but does not alter the qualitative results for the purpose of this research.
6 Our results will not change if the upper bound is an arbitrary positive number.
them to advertisers.
For simplicity, we assume two types of advertiser quality, a l and a h (a l < a h ) and use x ∈ {l, h} to index an advertiser's quality type. The probability of an advertiser being h-type (i.e. high-quality)
is α. Similarly, we assume two types of provider quality, b l and b h (b l < b h ), and use y ∈ {l, h} to a provider's quality type. The probability of a provider being h-type (i.e., high-quality) is β.
Providers lack complete information about an advertiser's quality. We use a parameter γ A to model the degree of information incompleteness. Specically, providers are unaware of an advertiser's true type x but share a priorx ∈ {l, h} about the advertiser's type, which diers from the true type x with probability γ A . That is,
We interpret γ A as a provider's probability of misclassifying an advertiser. Similarly, advertisers share a priorŷ ∈ {l, h} about a provider's type (e.g., they observe the same evidence about the provider's quality) and γ P is the advertisers' probability of misclassifying a provider, i.e.
By having parameters γ A and γ P , we allow various degrees of information asymmetry between advertisers and providers, ranging from complete information (γ = 0) to no information at all (γ = 0.5).
In general, providers have a low misclassication rate γ A when they accumulate much click data and uses such data to estimate advertiser quality. Advertisers have a low misclassication rate γ P when they have extended experience with the providers. In addition, environmental uncertainty aects both rates (γ A and γ P ): the more noise in the advertisement's performance, the more dicult it is for advertisers and providers to learn each other's quality.
Pricing schemes and auction formats. Advertising providers uses an auction to allocate their impressions. A provider can choose from three pricing schemes: PPI, PPC, and a PPI/PPC hybrid.
7 Let M = {I, C, H} denote available pricing schemes.
The auction follows two general rules. First, all bidders are ranked by expected value per impression. This ranking rule approximates the actual ranking rules used by leading advertising providers 8 and is consistent with the ranking rules used in prior work (Wilbur and Zhu, 2009 ).
7 We can easily re-interpret our results as a choice between PPI, PPS, and a PPI/PPS hybrid or between PPC, PPS, and a PPC/PPS hybrid.
8 Google, for example, explains how dierent pricing schemes compete in the same auction on the basis of expected Also, prior analyses have shown that such a ranking rule can be justied on the basis of maximizing allocative eciency (Liu et al., 2010; Lahaie and Pennock, 2007) . Second, the winner of the auction does not pay own bid but instead pays the minimum price to keep the winning position. This payment rule is again consistent with the generalized second price rule used in practice and with the prior literature (Zhu and Wilbur, 2010; . These two general rules, when combined with specic pricing schemes, result in the following specic auction formats:
• In the PPI auction, advertisers bid on PPI and the winner pays the second highest bid.
• In the PPC auction, advertisers bid on PPC, PPC bids are weighted by the expected quality of the advertisers, and the winner pays the minimum PPC price to keep the winning position.
• In the hybrid auction, advertisers bid on PPI or PPC. PPI bids are unweighted but PPC bids are weighted by the expected quality of the advertisers. The winner pays the minimum PPI or PPC price to keep the winning position.
It shall be noted that in the hybrid auction, the choice of PPC weighting factors aects advertisers' choice between PPC and PPI bids, which in turn aects PPC weighting factors because PPC weighting factors, calculated as expected quality of PPC bidders, are inuenced by the composition of PPC bidders. If PPC weighting factors are too high or too low, the hybrid auction can degenerate to a pure PPC or pure PPI auction (Edelman and Lee, 2008) . We later show that there exists a unique PPC weighting factor such that the hybrid auction does not degenerate and the weighting factor reects PPC advertisers' expected quality. We shall use this weighting factor for hybrid auctions.
The allocative eciency in our setting is dened as the winner's valuation for the impression,
where v (1) and a (1) denote the winning advertiser's valuation-per-click and quality, and b denotes the chosen provider's quality. We say an auction is ecient if it always chooses the winner who values the impression the most.
The game timeline. The game proceeds as follows. At rst, nature draws the quality types for all advertisers and providers, who learn their own types but not others. at the second stage, after a provider is chosen and the pricing scheme is announced, a bidding game is played by the advertisers. At the rst stage, a game is played by the providers who must choose a pricing scheme, anticipating the impact of their choice on the subsequent bidding by advertisers.
A provider chooses the pricing scheme m ∈ {I, C, H} to maximize the expected revenue. Let σ y (m) denote the probability for a y-type provider to choose pricing scheme m. A strategy prole σ = (σ l , σ h ) describes the strategies of both l-type and h-type providers. When both types of providers play pure strategies (i.e., choose a pricing scheme with probability 1), we can simply write the strategy prole as σ = (m l , m h ). For example, (I, C) means that an l-type provider chooses PPI and an h-type provider chooses PPC.
Equilibrium Analysis
We use backward induction to analyze this game. We rst characterize the advertisers' equilibrium bidding and derive a given provider's expected revenue under each pricing scheme. We then examine the game between providers and nd their equilibrium strategy proles.
Preliminaries
We begin by examining how a provider forms expectations about advertisers' quality. The provider does not know the advertisers' true types and thus can only form expectations based on priors. We denoteâx as the expected quality of an advertiser with a quality priorx. Naturally, because of misclassication, the expected quality of advertiser with an h-prior is less than a h and the expected quality of an advertiser with an l-prior is more than a l , i.e., (see Appendix A.A.1 for proofs of results in this section),
Advertisers form expectations of a provider's quality based not only on the priorŷ but also on the pricing scheme choice m, because dierent types of providers may inherently prefer dierent pricing schemes. We denote µ (·|m) as advertisers' belief about a provider's quality type conditional on the announced pricing scheme m (but not on the prior). Given this belief and the priorŷ, advertisers can calculate the expected quality of a provider (ŷ, m), denoted asb m y .
Because advertisers may obtain a low or high prior about a provider, the provider also needs to know its average expected quality, denoted asb m y . When two types of providers choose a pricing scheme m with equal probability, advertisers' belief µ (·|m) coincides with the natural probabilities of the two provider types. We useb y to denote the average expected quality in this special case.
Intuitively, because advertisers may misclassify providers, the average expected quality of an h-type (l-type) provider is less (more) than the true quality, i.e.,
For notational convenience, we sometimes use a,â,b, andb as shorthands for a x ,âx,b m y , and b m y .
3.2
The Advertiser's Equilibrium Bidding
Equilibrium Bidding under the PPI Auction
The PPI auction can be viewed as a standard second-price auction in which a bidder's valuation for the impression is vab. Because the expected quality of a providerb is the same across all advertisers, an advertiser wins the PPI auction when she has the highest valuation for the impression. Hence, Lemma 1. The PPI auction is ecient.
In the PPI auction, we may characterize each advertiser using a pair (v, a). Because an advertiser wins when she has the highest va, an advertiser's equilibrium winning probability, denoted as φ I (v, a), can be calculated as,
where the expression
is the probability that advertiser (v, a) has a higher valuation for the impression than another advertiser who may be high-or low-quality.
Proposition 1. Given provider's strategy prole σ, a y-type provider's expected revenue under the PPI auction is
where π I base , termed as the base revenue of the PPI auction, is given by
All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Recall thatb I y is a provider's average expected quality for choosing PPI. Proposition 1 suggests that the PPI auction revenue has a base revenue component π I base and a provider expected quality componentb I y . Because advertisers' winning probabilities are based on the true quality, the provider's incomplete information does not aect the base revenue. On the other hand, the provider expected quality is clearly aected by advertisers' incomplete information. A high-quality provider suers from advertiser's imperfect information and a low-quality provider benets because of provider pooling (see (3)).
Equilibrium Bidding under the PPC Auction
Under the PPC auction, each bid is weighted by advertiser's expected qualityâ. In the proof of Proposition 2, we establish that an advertiser (v,â) wins the PPC auction if and only if the advertiser's weighted valuation (i.e., vâ) is the highest. So an advertiser (v,â) has an equilibrium winning probability,
This winning probability is similar to its PPI counterpart (4) except a replacement of true quality a with the expected qualityâ.
Because advertisers are ranked by vâ instead of va, the PPC auction is generally inecient.
Proposition 2. Given provider strategy prole σ, a y-type provider's expected revenue under the PPC auction is
where π C base , termed as the base revenue of the PPC auction, is given by
The PPC auction revenue similarly has a base revenue component π C base and a provider quality component b y . In contrast with the PPI auction, the provider's incomplete information about advertisers aects the base revenue through the weighting factors; advertisers' incomplete information about the provider does not aect the provider quality component, as the provider's quality is transparent under the PPC auction.
Equilibrium Bidding under the Hybrid Auction
For the hybrid auction, we must also specify the weighting factors for PPC bids. We rst examine how the weighting factor w for PPC bids aects an advertiser's choice.
Lemma 2. Under a hybrid auction, an advertiser with quality a and weighting factor w will choose PPI when ab > w, PPC when ab < w, and be indierent when ab = w.
When the weighting factor is high enough (i.e., w > a hb ), an advertiser chooses PPC regardless of valuation or quality type. The hybrid auction degenerates into a pure PPC auction. When the weighting factor is low enough (i.e., w < a lb ), an advertiser chooses PPI regardless of quality type or valuation and the hybrid auction degenerates into a pure PPI auction. Only when the weighting factor is at a moderate level, w ∈ a lb , a hb , two types of advertisers will separate: all high-quality advertisers choose PPI whereas all low-quality advertiser choose PPC.
We are interested in a hybrid scheme that does not degenerate. By Lemma 2, a weighting w ∈ a lb , a hb will completely separate low and high-quality advertisers such that all PPC bidders are low-quality. By our auction ranking rule, the provider should assign a PPC weighting factor of w = a lb . 9
Assumption 1. Under the hybrid auction, the weighting factor for PPC bids is w = a lb .
Lemma 3. Under the hybrid auction, if w = a lb , then (a) the equilibrium bid function strictly increases in v and (b) a high-quality advertiser (v h , a h ) and a low-quality advertiser (v l , a l ) tie in equilibrium if and only if
Lemma 3 suggests that a hybrid auction with PPC weighting factor w = a lb is as ecient as the PPI auction because they rank the advertisers in the same way.
By Assumption 1 and Lemma 3, we can calculate the equilibrium winning probability of an
Not surprisingly, the probability of winning for each advertiser under the hybrid scheme is exactly the same as that under the PPI auction, given that both auctions allocate the impression the same way. However, the provider's expected revenues are dierent under two auctions.
Proposition 3. Given provider strategy prole σ, a y-type provider's expected revenue under a hybrid auction is:
where
are termed as the base revenues from high-and low-quality advertisers respectively.
Because the PPI auction and the hybrid auction allocate the impression the same way, the base revenues from two types of advertisers are in fact the same under two auctions. Using the notations 9 Recall, as noted earlier, each advertiser's bid is weighted by her expected quality for the hybrid auction, we may rewrite the PPI base revenue as:
A notable dierence between the two auctions, though, is that under hybrid auction, the revenue from low-quality advertisers is not subject to provider pooling. Hence, we have the following result, Corollary 1. Suppose both provider types must choose the same pricing scheme, a high-quality provider is better o under the hybrid scheme than under PPI, and a low-quality provider is worse o.
The intuition for Corollary 1 is as follows: when both provider types choose the hybrid scheme, they partially pool because provider types are transparent to low-quality advertisers (who choose PPC bids). In contrast, two provider types fully pool under the PPI scheme. High-quality providers, who suer from pooling, prefer the partial pooling under the hybrid scheme to the full pooling under the PPI scheme. The converse is true for low-quality providers.
Provider's Equilibrium Pricing Strategy
From the previous analysis, high-quality providers have the incentive to dierentiate from lowquality providers; whereas low-quality providers have the incentive to pool with high-quality ones.
So high-and low-quality providers must choose their pricing schemes strategically and a game is played between providers of dierent quality types. This game resembles a signaling game except that in the case of PPC, a provider's type is transparent in the sense that the knowledge of it has no impact on advertisers' equilibrium bidding or auction revenue.
We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) for the provider's game, which requires that the Bayesian rule determines advertisers' beliefs about a provider's quality, whenever possible. As is well known, signaling games often have multiple equilibria. To focus on a subset of equilibria that are most plausible, we make the following equilibrium renement assumptions.
Assumption 2. A weakly-dominated strategy is not played.
Assumption 3. A Pareto-dominated equilibrium is not played.
The rationale for Assumption 2 is that weakly dominated strategies are imprudent and therefore players should avoid them. An equilibrium Pareto dominates another equilibrium if all players are not worse o and at least one is strictly better o under the former. One motivation for focusing on Pareto un-dominated equilibrium is that a Pareto-dominated equilibrium could be avoided by pre-game negotiations.
To illustrate the impact of the hybrid scheme, we examine and compare two cases: when the hybrid scheme is an option for providers and when it is not.
3.3.1 When the Hybrid Scheme is Not Allowed the Benchmark Case
As a benchmark, we rst examine the case in which providers can choose between PPI and PPC only. When π I base < π C base , both types of providers prefer PPC to PPI so the only equilibrium is 
Borrowing the terminology of signaling games, we call (I, C) a separating equilibrium and (I, I) a pooling equilibrium.
In Proposition 4, a low-quality provider always chooses PPI, whereas a high-quality provider may choose either PPC or PPI depending on whether condition (13) is satised. The main tradeo for a high-quality provider is to pool with a low-quality provider or to separate by choosing a pay-for-performance scheme at the cost of inecient allocations. To gain further insights on this tradeo, we perform the following comparative static analysis:
Corollary 2. The separating equilibrium (I, C) is more likely when (a) the probability of high-quality provider β is low,
the probability of misclassifying a provider γ P is low, and 10 This case is more interesting for two reasons. First, because the PPI auction is more ecient than the PPC auction, the case π I base ≥ π C base is a rst-order approximation. Although prior research (e.g., Liu and Chen 2006) argue that the opposite cases can also occur, they do so under a restrictive condition. Second, the equilibrium in which all provider types choose PPC seems inconsistent with the coexistence of multiple pricing schemes in practice. 11 Figure 2 illustrates the provider's equilibrium strategy prole as a function of misclassication probabilities. As the probability of misclassifying providers γ P increases, a high-quality provider is more likely to adopt PPC. As the probability of misclassifying advertisers γ A increases, a highquality provider is generally more likely to adopt PPI. However, when γ A is too high, a high-quality provider may once again prefer PPC because misclassifying advertisers creates a sizable incentive eect (see footnote 11), which osets some of the revenue loss from inecient allocation. 11 In the PPC auction, because of misclassication, low-quality advertisers tend to receive a higher weighting factor and high-quality ones tend to receive a lower weighting factor. As a result, the competition between low-and high-quality advertisers intensies, forcing high-quality advertisers to bid higher. Such an incentive eect is most prominent under low competition for high-quality advertisers.
When the Hybrid Scheme is Allowed
Lemma 4. Under assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 1, (a)(I , I) with belief that a hybrid provider is high quality with probability no more than µ 1 (i.e., µ (h|H) ≤ µ 1 ) is a PBE when
where µ 1 is the maximum probability to satisfy the following two conditions:
(b)(H, H) with belief that a PPI provider is high quality with probability no more than µ 2 (i.e.,
and where µ 2 is the maximum probability to satisfy the following two conditions,
(c) (I, C) with belief that a hybrid provider is low quality (i.e.,µ (h|H) = 0) and (H, C) with belief that a PPI provider is low quality (i.e, µ (h|I) = 0) are PBE when
By Lemma 4, (I, I) is an equilibrium when condition (14) holds and advertisers believe a hybrid provider is most likely low-quality (i.e., µ (h|H) < µ 1 ). Similarly, (H, H) is an equilibrium when condition (17) holds and advertisers believe a PPI provider is most likely low-quality. The equilibrium (I, C) requires that condition (20) holds and advertisers believe a PPI provider is low quality.
Among the three types of equilibria, (I, I) is unstable in the following sense. We can infer from condition (15) that (I, I) requires advertisers to believe that a low-quality provider is more likely to deviate to the hybrid scheme than a high-quality one.
12 However, this is implausible because a low-quality provider prefers (I, I) and a high-quality provider prefers (H, H) (Corollary 1). We formalize this notion of stability in an uncompromised equilibrium concept. Denition 1. An uncompromised equilibrium requires that if an o-equilibrium action a in the current equilibrium is played by a player type t with probability p in an alternative equilibrium and t is better o in that equilibrium, then other players should assign a probability of no less than p to player type t for playing a in the current equilibrium. If the current equilibrium fails to hold under such an o-equilibrium belief, we say the current equilibrium is compromised by the alternative equilibrium.
The uncompromised equilibrium is a generalization of Mailath et al.'s(1993) undefeated equilibrium, which says that if all the player types who play the o-equilibrium action in an alternative equilibrium are strictly better o in that equilibrium, the probability assigned to each player type must be exactly according to the alternative equilibrium. Both the undefeated equilibrium and the uncompromised equilibrium view o-equilibrium messages as attempts to overturn the current equilibrium by player types who seek a better alternative. The dierence lies in that our denition extends to the case where an o-equilibrium action is played by both better-o and worse-o player types in an alternative equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Under assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 1, (H, H) with belief that a PPI provider is high quality with probability no more than µ 2 (i.e., µ (h|I) ≤ µ 2 , where µ 2 is dened in (4)) is an uncompromised PBE when
(21) (I, C) with belief that a hybrid provider is low quality and (H, C) with belief that a PPI provider is low quality are uncompromised PBE when
( 22) 12 To see this, we need to show µ (h|H) < β. If µ (h|H) ≥ β, we haveb
one of the inequality must be strict), which contradicts (15). As in the benchmark case (Proposition 5), the provider's game has a separating equilibrium, in the form of (I, C) or (H, C), and a pooling equilibrium, in the form of (H, H). The separating equilibria (I, C) and (H, C) are eectively the same for all parties because in either case, advertisers correctly infer a provider's quality from the pricing scheme, and the two auctions allocate the advertising impressions exactly the same way and generate the same revenues by Proposition 3.
Remarkably, Proposition 5 suggests that with the hybrid scheme, (H, H) replaces (I, I) as the new pooling equilibrium. This implies that the hybrid scheme can dominate the PPI scheme in equilibrium, even though a hybrid auction is no more ecient or protable than a PPI auction when examined as a standalone auction. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper to rationalize the use of the hybrid scheme as an equilibrium choice. The intuition for this result is as follows.
The hybrid auction is as ecient as the PPI auction (Proposition 3), but the cost to pool for a high-quality provider is lower under the hybrid scheme because of partial pooling. So a highquality provider prefers (H, H) whereas a low-quality provider prefers (I, I). (H, H) is selected in equilibrium because advertisers believes that a low-quality provider is more likely to deviate from (H, H) to (I, I) and such a belief deters deviation. In contrast, the (I, I) equilibrium is compromised by the belief that a deviator is more likely a high-quality provider.
Proposition 5 also suggests that the two provider types pool more often than without the hybrid scheme note that condition (21) Figure 3 shows provider's equilibrium strategy prole as a function of misclassication rates. In this gure, the solid line represents the boundary between the separating equilibrium (region I) and the pooling equilibrium (regions II and III), whereas the dashed line represents the boundary in the benchmark case. The shape of the new boundary (solid line) is similar to that in the benchmark case: a high-quality provider is more likely to adopt PPC when the probability of misclassifying a provider γ P increases and when the probability of misclassifying advertisers γ A decreases (except when it is very high). The shift in the boundary before and after the introduction of the hybrid scheme suggests that two provider types pool more often after the hybrid scheme is introduced.
We summarize the impact of the hybrid scheme in the following Corollary and table.
Corollary 3. By adding the hybrid scheme to provider's options, we nd that (a) (I, C) is replaced by (H, C) or (I, C) in some cases (region I of Figure 3 ), which leaves providers, advertisers, and overall allocative eciency unaected.
(b) (I, C) is replaced by (H, H) in other cases (region II of Figure 3 ), which benets all the providers and improves overall allocative eciency.
(c) (I, I) is replaced by (H, H) (region III of Figure 3 ), which benets a high-quality provider, hurts a low-quality provider, and does not aect advertisers' expected payo or overall allocative eciency.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our study is among the rst to examine the optimality of dierent pricing schemes in the presence of information asymmetry between providers and advertisers. Our ndings illustrate how providers can use dierent pricing schemes not only to rank advertisers dierently but also to reveal their targeting quality. Because advertisers have incomplete information about provider quality, lowquality providers can benet from pooling using PPI, whereas high-quality providers benet from separating themselves using more transparent pay-for-performance schemes. On the other hand, given the incomplete information about advertiser quality, the use of pay-for-performance schemes creates allocative ineciencies. This tradeo between the cost and benets of the dierent pricing schemes lies at the heart of our analyses.
Our analyses show that high-quality providers nd it optimal to choose the pay-for-performance scheme (e.g., PPC and PPS) when the benets of separating from low-quality providers outweigh the loss from allocative ineciency. Thus, a nascent high-quality provider may benet from the transparency aorded by pay-for-performance schemes, as its quality is largely unknown to adver-
tisers. An established high-quality provider may also benet from pay-for-performance schemes, but for a dierent reason: it may accumulate enough data to make good estimates about advertiser quality so that the cost of dierentiation is low. Examples of the latter include Google Search Ads and Amazon Product Ads.
Our ndings also suggest that high-quality providers may prefer a hybrid pricing scheme to a pure pricing scheme. While oering a hybrid scheme reduces a high-quality provider's ability to separate, it still benets the provider. First, any loss from pooling with low-quality providers is reduced because only a few advertisers -those who submit PPI bids -need to estimate the quality of the provider. Secondly, the allocative eciency of a hybrid scheme is similar to that of a pure PPI scheme because low-and high-quality advertisers self-select into dierent pricing schemes. A high-quality provider's adoption of hybrid schemes also forces low-quality providers to follow suit, leading to an equilibrium where the hybrid scheme prevails. That said, the hybrid scheme is more complex than pure pricing schemes and upfront costs, including setting up the automated auction platform and communicating to advertisers about the changes, can be a challenge for low-quality providers who have no experience with auction platforms or pay-for-performance pricing. This only makes hybrid schemes more attractive for high-quality providers as they can then use the hybrid scheme to dierentiate themselves. The increased adoption of hybrid schemes in recent years (e.g., Google Display Ads, Facebook, Twitter, and adBrite) seems to conrm our prediction that the hybrid scheme may be a strong alternative to pure schemes among high-quality providers.
Our research highlights the role of information asymmetry in determining pricing schemes. In a world of complete information, where providers perfectly know advertiser's quality and vice versa, dierent pricing schemes would be equivalent.
13 With information asymmetry, however, pricing schemes can be used as a means of leveraging private information: PPI leverages advertisers' private information; PPC leverages providers'; A hybrid scheme leverages both parties' to some degree.
Thus pricing schemes dier in how the responsibility of monitoring (or estimating) is divided among providers and advertisers. This theoretical perspective provides a useful alternative to the conventional "risk-sharing" model of pricing schemes where the choice of pricing schemes is driven by the degree of risk aversion of players.
Our framework and ndings highlight two important technologies in Internet advertising pricing:
the technology for targeting Internet users with the most relevant advertisements and the technology for monitoring the quality of advertisers. The targeting technology is necessary for providers to become high quality. Thus, a large premium portal (e.g., a major newspaper site) without targeting is considered low quality, and prefers the conventional PPI scheme. In contrast, an advertising network of many small, inferior websites that uses superior targeting technologies (e.g., Google
AdSense) is high quality; such networks frequently use pay-for-performance schemes. Meanwhile, the monitoring technology makes pay-for-performance schemes less costly by minimizing allocative ineciency. Google can aord pure PPC for its search advertising partly because it has data and technology prowess to achieve reliable estimates of advertiser quality.
In contrast with provider technologies, technologies that help advertisers track provider quality have an opposite eect: as provider quality becomes more transparent, the need for high-quality providers to separate diminishes; all providers would opt for conventional PPI. However, the eect of provider technologies likely subdues this eect because in the Internet advertising industry, the concentration is much higher on the provider side, giving providers advantages in adopting and rening their technologies.
Whether a high-quality provider should adopt a pure pay-for-performance scheme would depend not only on the monitoring technology, but also on two parties' relative contribution to advertisement performance. If advertisement performance is inuenced more by provider's quality, revealing one's high quality would be more important than eciently sorting advertisers, thus pay-for-performance scheme is more likely to be used. Conversely, if advertiser quality has more impact on advertisement performance, PPI or a hybrid scheme is more likely used to leverage advertisers' private information and preserve allocative eciency. Search engines and many broad-based advertising networks would not oer PPS because advertisers play a much more important role than advertising providers in converting clicks to sales.
Our study is a rst step in understanding the role of information asymmetry in the evolving landscape of pricing schemes for digital advertising. Our ndings pave the way for a number of possible extensions. Our model focuses on a representative provider drawn from a heterogeneous pool. A natural extension of our model is to examine the role of side-by-side provider competition.
Another way to extend existing insights is to understand the dynamics of pricing scheme choices.
Our study models issues of hidden information rather than hidden action. It would be interesting to consider the impacts of hidden action in addition to hidden information; Zhu and Wilbur (2010) and Chen et al. (2009) provide some clues in this direction. Additionally, other factors may also aect pricing scheme choices. For example, Athey and Ellison (2011) shows that PPC auctions suer additional ineciencies due to advertiser obfuscation; some argue that click fraud threatens the PPC pricing although research shows (Wilbur and Zhu, 2009 ) that the impact of click fraud on advertiser and search engine revenues may be ambiguous. In using our ndings, it is also important to combine our insights with risk preference considerations: ceteris paribus, risk-averse advertisers would prefer PPC, and risk-averse providers, PPI. While including risk aversion is likely to shift the optimality conditions, it has a predictable impact and is unlikely to reverse the broad ndings of our analyses. Finally, given the increased availability of data on advertising pricing schemes, empirical tests of these theoretical models would add to our understanding of this complex landscape. Let P (x|x) denote the probability that an x-type advertiser has a priorx. The probability of an
x-prior advertiser is
The expected quality of anx-prior advertiser is calculated aŝ
Becauseâx is a weighted average of a l and a h , we have a l ≤âx ≤ a h . We can also easily verify that a l ≤â h as long as γ A ≤ 0.5. Table 3 shows a numerical example of advertiser's expected quality.
x orx P (x) a x P (x)âx l We now turn to a provider's expected quality. When a pricing scheme m is played in the equilibrium, we can calculate the probability of a provider being a y-type, conditional on choosing m, using the Bayesian rule:
.
Given an advertiser's belief µ (y|m), the probability of a provider beingŷ-prior, conditional on the pricing scheme m, is
and the expected quality of aŷ-prior provider who chooses pricing scheme m iŝ
A provider's average expected quality, given the true type y and the pricing scheme choice m, is calculated asb
andb y is a special case ofb m y with µ (h|m) = β.
The proof of b l ≤b m l ≤b m h ≤ b h is similar to that for advertiser quality and thus omitted. Table 4 shows a numerical example of how advertiser's belief µ (h|m) aects provider's average expected quality.
µ (h|m) = 0.3 µ (h|m) = 0.7 From the preceding discussion, advertisers are ranked by va. Thus, the PPI auction always selects the advertiser who has the highest valuation for the impression. By denition, the PPI auction is ecient.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Omitted. Available on request.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Denote t (v,â) as the equilibrium bidding function of an advertiser with valuation v and expected qualityâ. We assume the bidding function is monotonic (proof available on request), i.e.,
We next show that advertisers(v,â l ) and
With a slight abuse of notation, we denote U (v, t|â) as the per-click payo of an advertiser (v,â) who bids t per click. We also denote φ C (t,â) and p (t,â) as the winning probability and expected payment per click of an advertiser with expect qualityâ and bid t. Now let advertiser(v,â l ) bid t and advertiser
where the second equality is because two advertisers tie and pay the same expected amount. (28) implies that if thus proving (27) . (26) and (27) together imply that an advertiser (v,â) wins if and only if the advertiser's vâ is the highest.
By the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson, 1981) , we can obtain the equilibrium payo (per click) of advertiser (v,â) as,
Because the expected payment per click from the advertiser is
a y-type provider's expected revenue from all advertisers is
where the third equality is due to integration by parts.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Denote φ H (z) as the equilibrium winning probability of an advertiser who bids a score of z (the score can be calculated from either a PPI bid or a PPC bid). Denote s (z) as the expected second highest score conditional on the highest score being z. We now consider an advertiser (v, a) with a PPC weighting factor w. If the advertiser submits a PPI bid v ab, the expected payo (per impression) is,
If the advertiser submits a PPC bid v , the expected payo (per impression) is
Clearly, when ab = w, U I (v, v ) = U C (v, v ), which means that the advertiser is indierent between the two pricing schemes. Now suppose ab < w. Let v * ab be the advertiser's optimal PPI bid. By submitting a PPC bid of v * ab/w, the advertiser gets an expected utility:
So the advertiser prefers PPC when ab < w. Similarly, we can show that when ab > w, the advertiser prefers PPI.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
By Lemma 2, when w = a lb , high-quality advertisers choose PPI while low-quality advertisers choose PPC. The proof for a strictly increasing equilibrium bidding function under the hybrid scheme is analogous to that under PPC and is available on request. We focus on (b). Consider a high-quality advertiser (v h , a h ) who submits a PPI bid ta lb and a low-quality advertiser (v l , a l ) who submits a PPC bid t. By equations (30) and (31), the two advertisers' expected payos, denoted as U h and U l respectively, are,
When v l a l = v h a h , we have U h = U l . So if t is the optimal bid for the low-quality advertiser, then ta lb must be the optimal bid for the high-quality advertiser, suggesting that two advertisers will tie in equilibrium. Given that bidding functions strictly increases, there cannot be an advertiser (8) is also a necessary condition.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
We denote V H l (v) as the advertiser's equilibrium payo per click from low-quality advertisers under the hybrid scheme. By the revenue equivalence theorem, we get
and the expected payment per click from a low-quality advertiser iŝ
Adding (35) and (36) So a low-quality provider strictly prefers PPC. This suggests that (C, C) is the only PBE.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 4
Under Assumption 4, a low-quality provider gets an expected revenue ofb l π I base under PPI and b l π C base under PPC. Becauseb l ≥ b l , PPC is weakly dominated and thus not played by low-quality providers. So we only consider the remaining two strategy proles (I, C) and (I, I).
For (I, C) to be a PBE, we only need to show that a high-quality provider optimally chooses 
Because b l <b h , conditions (37) and (38) may hold at the same time. We next show that (I, C)
is Pareto dominated when both (37) and (38) The impact on advertiser payos. In the case where (I, C) is replaced by (H, C), all advertisers are indierent because the PPI auction and the hybrid auction allocate the impression in the same way and in both cases, advertisers perfectly infer the provider's quality. In the case where (I, I) is replaced by (H, H) , advertisers are indierent too. Again, because PPI and hybrid auctions allocate the impression in the same way, their winning probabilities and expected payos are the same under either equilibrium. In the case where (I, C) is replaced by (H, H), advertisers winning probabilities are dierent and we are unable to draw a denitive conclusion on advertiser payos because when the provider is high quality (so that PPC would be used under and (I, C) equilibrium), a highquality advertiser can be better o or worse o under PPC depending on whether the prior about the advertiser's quality is high or not.
Impact on allocative eciency. We know from earlier proofs that PPI and hybrid auctions are more ecient than PPC auctions. The results on the overall eciency follow immediately.
